Stochastic Dynamics for the Matching Pennies Game

We consider stochastic dynamics for the Matching Pennies game, that behave, in expectation, like best-response dynamics (the continuous fictitious play). We prove convergence to the unique equilibrium by extending the result of Benaim and Weibull [2003] on deterministic approximations for stochastic dynamics to the case of discontinuous dynamics - such as the best-reply dynamics.

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Year of publication:	2006-11
Authors:	Gorodeisky, Ziv
Institutions:	Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	12 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585403