Stochastic evolution with slow learning

This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2001-10-29
Authors:	Beggs, Alan
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 2, p. 379-405
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Equilibrium selection \| Diffusion approximation \| Evolutionary game theory \| Risk dominance

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: January 19, 2000; revised version: September 25, 2000
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753336