Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning

This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does.

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Year of publication:	2000-10-01
Authors:	Beggs, Alan
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Oxford University
Subject:	equilibrium selection \| diffusion approximation \| evolutionary game theory \| risk dominance

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Series Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 33
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604827