Stochastic Mechanisms and Quasi-Linear Preferences

Many optimal contracting papers use quasi-linear preferences. To exclude stochastic mechanisms they impose a (su cient) condition on how the curvature of an agent's objective function varies with type. We show with quasi-linear preferences that an optimal deterministic outcome without bunching implies that stochastic mechanisms are not optimal (without any additional assumptions)

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Schottmüller, Christoph
Other Persons:	Boone, Jan (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Series:	CentER Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2012-047
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 13, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2083660 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105176