Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly

Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives for firms to commit to maximize a performance metric other than profit. We briefly review the underlying theory, analyze its ramifications in a Cournot duopoly, and consider feasibility constraints from the perspective of strategic management.

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Year of publication:	2012-07-01
Authors:	Rtischev, Dimitry
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	oligopolistic competition \| strategic commitment \| strategic delegation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Gakushuin Economic Papers 2.49(2012): pp. 133-142
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109023