Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Uno, Hiroshi
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 47.2011, 6, p. 728-732
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Strategic complementarities \| Potential games \| Existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065395