Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games

We provide sufficient conditions in finite-horizon multi-stage games for the value function of each player, associated to extremal Markov perfect equilibria, to display strategic complementarities and for the contemporaneous equilibrium to be increasing in the state variables.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006-03-21
Authors:	Vives, Xavier
Institutions:	IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra
Subject:	Markov game \| supermodularity \| two-stage game \| adjustment costs \| learning curve \| network effects

More details

Series:	IESE Research Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series IESE Research Papers Number D/619 27 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005053787