Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction

Stephan Knapek; Achim Wambach

Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is "close to optimal". We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial. -- combinatorial clock auction

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Knapek, Stephan ; Wambach, Achim
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Mobilkommunikation \| Mobile communications \| Konzession \| Concession \| Lizenz \| Licence \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 317 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 3983
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/66871 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; L96 - Telecommunications
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009665382