Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction

Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Knapek, Stephan ; Wambach, Achim
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Mobilkommunikation \| Konzession \| Lizenz \| Theorie \| combinatorial clock auction

More details

Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 3983
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	730412792 [GVK] hdl:10419/66871 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; L96 - Telecommunications
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010289636