Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Fesselmeyer, Eric ; Santugini, Marc |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 37.2013, 1, p. 125-136
|
Subject: | Conservation | Dynamic games | Environmental risk | Renewable resources | Tragedy of the commons | Gemeingüter | Commons | Erneuerbare Ressourcen | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Umweltbelastung | Pollution | Ressourcenökonomik | Resource economics | Risiko | Risk | Umweltökonomik | Environmental economics | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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