Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning

In a model of incomplete, heterogeneous information, with externalities and strategic interactions, we analyse the possibility of adaptive learning to act as coordination device. We build on the framework introduced by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and extend it to a setting where agents need to learn to coordinate. We analyse conditions under which learning obtains, and show that adaptive learning can solve the problem of socially ine¢ cient coordination.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Berardi, Michele
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of Manchester

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	22 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643057