Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women, in contrast with the result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence of externalities.

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Year of publication:	2019-12-18
Authors:	Mumcu, Ayse ; Saglam, Ismail

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2019): Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities.
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015266066