Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information.

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Gossner, O. ; Vieille, N.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	INFORMATION \| GAMES \| MODELS (C.O.R.E.) \| LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE BELGIQUE. 31p

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005669288