Strategic manipulation of empirical tests
Theories can be produced by individuals seeking a good reputation of knowledge. Hence, a significant question is how to test theories anticipating that they might have been produced by (potentially uninformed) experts who prefer their theories not to be rejected. If a theory that predicts exactly like the data generating process is not rejected with high probability then the test is said to not reject the truth. On the other hand, if a false expert, with no knowledge over the data generating process, can strategically select theories that will not be rejected then the test can be ignorantly passed. These tests have limited use because they cannot feasibly dismiss completely uninformed experts. Many tests proposed in the literature (e.g., calibration tests) can be ignorantly passed. Dekel and Feinberg (2006) introduced a class of tests that seemingly have some power of dismissing uninformed experts. We show that some tests from their class can also be ignorantly passed. One of those tests, however, does not reject the truth and cannot be ignorantly passed. Thus, this empirical test can dismiss false experts.
|Year of publication:||
|Authors:||Olszewski, Wojciech ; Sandroni, Alvaro|
Evanston : Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
|Type of publication:||Book / Working Paper|
|Type of publication (narrower categories):||Working Paper|
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