Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems
John Kennes, Daniel Monte, and Norovsambuu Tumennasan
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kennes, John ; Monte, Daniel ; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu |
| Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 11.2019, 2, p. 55-97
|
| Subject: | Matching | Zuordnungsproblem | Assignment problem | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Manipulation | Schulauswahl | School choice | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1257/mic.20170077 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012233