Strategic Policy Interactions in a Monetary Union

by Michael Carlberg

This book studies the strategic policy interactions in a monetary union. The leading protagonists are the European Central Bank and national governments. The target of the ECB is low inflation in Europe. The targets of a national government are low unemployment and a low structural deficit. There are demand shocks, supply shocks, and mixed shocks. There are country-specific shocks and common shocks. This book develops a series of basic, intermediate, and more advanced models. Here the focus is on the Nash equilibrium. The key questions are: Given a shock, can policy interactions reduce the existing loss? And to what extent can they do so? Another topical issue is policy cooperation. To illustrate all of this there are a lot of numerical examples.

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Year of publication:	2009
Other Persons:	Carlberg, Michael (contributor)
Publisher:	Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject:	Währungsunion \| Monetary union \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy \| Inflationsbekämpfung \| Anti-inflation policy \| Finanzpolitik \| Fiscal policy \| Nationalstaat \| Nation state \| Haushaltskonsolidierung \| Fiscal consolidation \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik \| International economic policy \| Zwei-Länder-Modell \| Two-country model \| Theorie \| Theory \| Eurozone \| Fiskalpolitik \| Strategisches Spiel \| Zielkonflikt
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] ; Description [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] ; Description [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] ; Description [swbplus.bsz-bw.de]

Extent:	Online-Ressource (digital)
Series:	SpringerLink / Bücher
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references and index CONTENTS; Introduction; Part One. The Monetary Union as a Whole:Absence of a Deficit Target; Chapter 1. Monetary Policy A; Chapter 2. Monetary Policy B; Chapter 3. Fiscal Policy A; Chapter 4. Fiscal Policy B; Chapter 5. Interaction between Central Bank and Government; Chapter 6. Cooperation between Central Bank and Government; Chapter 7. Interaction between Central Bank and Government:A Special Case; Part Two. The Monetary Union as a Whole:Presence of a Deficit Target; Chapter 1. Fiscal Policy A; Chapter 2. Fiscal Policy B; Chapter 3. Interaction between Central Bank and Government A Chapter 4. Interaction between Central Bank and Government BChapter 5. Interaction between Central Bank and Government C; Chapter 6. Cooperation between Central Bank and Government; Part Three. The Monetary Union of Two Countries:Absence of a Deficit Target; Chapter 1. Monetary Policy in Europe A; Chapter 2. Monetary Policy in Europe B; Chapter 3. Fiscal Policy in Germany A; Chapter 4. Fiscal Policy in Germany B; Chapter 5. Interaction between European Central Bank, German Government, and French Government Chapter 6. Cooperation between European Central Bank,German Government, and French GovernmentPart Four. The Monetary Union of Two Countries:Presence of a Deficit Target; Chapter 1. Fiscal Policy in Germany A; Chapter 2. Fiscal Policy in Germany B; Chapter 3. Interaction between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government A; Chapter 4. Interaction between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government B; Chapter 5. Interaction between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government C Chapter 6. Cooperation between European Central Bank,German Government, and French GovernmentSynopsis; Conclusion; Result; Symbols; The Current Research Project; References; Index
ISBN:	978-3-540-92751-8 ; 978-3-540-92750-1
Other identifiers:	10.1007/978-3-540-92751-8 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013521136