Strategic Press Release When Employee Unemployment Risk is Better Insured

Using the staggered changes in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits across states in the US as an exogenous shock to employees’ costs of unemployment and the hiring firm’s costs of disclosure, this study investigates whether and how a firm’s relationship with its employees impacts its strategic disclosure through press releases. We find that firms increase (reduce) bad (good) press releases after their employees’ UI benefits become more generous. This finding is consistent with the notion that larger UI benefits reduce the costs of employee employment risk borne by hiring firms and thus reduce firms’ costs to release more bad news items. Interestingly, we find that the large increase in UI benefits is associated with more discretionary, but not nondiscretionary, bad press releases. The findings are robust when we exclude earnings-related press releases from our sample. Further evidence shows that the increase in negative press releases is mainly driven by news regarding earnings, products-services, marketing, credit-ratings, assets, and legal issues, which are more closely related to employee perceptions of unemployment risk