Strategic silence, insider seeling and litigation risk
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Billings, Mary Brooke ; Cedergren, Matthew C. |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 59.2015, 2/3, p. 119-142
|
Subject: | Disclosure | Earnings guidance | Insider trading | Litigation risk | Earnings disappointment | Negative earnings news | Insiderhandel | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Gewinnermittlung | Profit determination | Risiko | Risk | Zivilprozess | Civil litigation | Gewinnprognose | Earnings announcement | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Haftung | Liability | Gewinn | Profit | Ankündigungseffekt | Announcement effect | Lohn | Wages | Börsenkurs | Share price |
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