Strategic Uniformed Traders

We analyze the choice of financial instruments to issue for a firm in a context where informational asymmetries exist in credit relationships. Investors are heterogenous since they do not possess identical firm-specific information. We generalize Boot and Thakor's (1993) approach but depart from their idea that asset splitting is facilitated by the presence of uninformed noisy traders.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Augier, L. ; Mokrane, M.
Institutions:	Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.
Subject:	TRADE \| INFORMATION

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Series:	Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	23 pages
Classification:	D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G11 - Portfolio Choice
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618890