Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency

In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and budget-balance.

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Year of publication:	2008-04
Authors:	Hashimoto, Kazuhiko ; Saitoh, Hiroki
Institutions:	Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Subject:	Queueing Problems \| Strategy-Proofness \| Anonymity in welfare \| Efficiency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers in Economics and Business.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 08-17 14 pages
Classification:	D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710066