Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies.

We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there is one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfies "strategy-proofness," "individual rationality," "no exploitation" and "nonbossiness." Any such procedure is a scheme of "semiconvex cost sharing" determined by the "minimum demand principle."

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Serizawa, Shigehiro
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 7.1996, 3, p. 501-12
Publisher:	Springer

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370965