Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*)

We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there are one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfy "strategy-proofness," "individual rationality", "no exploitation" and "non-bossiness". Any such procedure is a scheme of "semi-convex cost sharing" determined by "the minimum demand principle".

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Serizawa, Shigehiro
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 7.1996, 3, p. 501-512
Publisher:	Springer

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Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: June 2, 1993; revised version January 1995
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371110