Strategy-Proof Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: Improvement of the Supremal Welfare Loss

We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, budget-balance, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty and non-bossiness. We also show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal welfare loss compared with the average cost pricing rule [Moulin (1999) and Moulin and Shenker (2001)].

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Year of publication:	2010-11
Authors:	Hashimoto, Kazuhiko ; Saitoh, Hiroki
Institutions:	Faculty of Economics, Kobe University

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1014 36 pages longages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727408