Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance : a maximal domain for possibility
Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kesten, Onur ; Kurino, Morimitsu |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 117.2019, p. 120-143
|
| Subject: | Outside options | Pareto dominance | Strategy-proofness | Student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Allokation | Allocation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.010 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012226515