Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design : ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Kazumura, Tomoya ; Mishra, Debasis ; Serizawa, Shigehiro |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 188.2020, p. 1-30
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| Subject: | Multi-object auction | Strategy-proofness | Ex-post revenue maximization | Minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism | Non-quasilinear preferences | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Allokation | Allocation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012424295