Strategy-proof multidimensional mechanism design
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Basu, Ranojoy ; Mukherjee, Conan |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5471, ZDB-ID 2004273-5. - Vol. 49.2024, 4, p. 2768-2785
|
Subject: | heterogeneous objects | nonunit demand | object-specific reserve price | pivotal mechanism | strategy-proofness | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods |
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