Strategy-proof preference aggregation : possibilities and characterizations
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bossert, Walter ; Sprumont, Yves |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 85.2014, p. 109-126
|
Subject: | Preference aggregation | Strategy-proofness | Population monotonicity | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Aggregation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
-
Arrovian efficiency and auditability in discrete mechanism design
Pycia, Marek, (2022)
-
Arrovian efficiency and auditability in discrete mechanism design
Pycia, Marek, (2021)
-
Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
Martínez, Ricardo, (2013)
- More ...
-
Infinite-horizon choice functions
Asheim, Geir B., (2006)
-
MAXIMAL-ELEMENT RATIONALIZABILITY
BOSSERT, Walter, (2002)
-
Maximal-Element Rationalizability
BOSSERT, Walter, (2002)
- More ...