Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

Alexander Reffgen, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over $A$.

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Year of publication:	September 2012
Authors:	Reffgen, Alexander ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 7.2012, 3, p. 663-688
Subject:	Multiple public goods \| strategy-proofness \| voting under constraints \| additive preferences \| separable preferences \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Pareto-Optimum \| Pareto efficiency

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE909 [DOI] hdl:10419/150182 [Handle]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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