Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges.

We study social choice functions for societies confronting alternatives which can be described as vectors in a Euclidean space, and where all voters have preferences on these alternatives which are saturated at an ideal point and satisfy an appropriate restriction of single-peakedness.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Masso, J. ; Barbera, S.
Institutions:	Association of Southern European Economic Theorists - ASSET
Subject:	SOCIAL CHOICE \| VOTING

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Series:	ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	1 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474441