Strategy-proofness and unimodality in bounded distributive lattices

It is shown that a social choice rule f : X<sup>N</sup> ? X as defined on a bounded distributive lattice (X, ) is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of unimodal total preorders on X if and only if it can be represented as an iterated median of projections and constants. The equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness that is known to hold in more specialized unimodal domains fails in such a more general setting.

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Year of publication:	2012-06
Authors:	Savaglio, Ernesto ; Vannucci, Stefano
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, Facoltà di Economia "Richard M. Goodwin"

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economics University of Siena.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010087