Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Müller, Michael ; Puppe, Clemens |
Subject: | Costly voting | Generalized medians | Participation | Strategy-proofness | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter | Partizipation | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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