Strategy-proofness makes the difference : deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ehlers, Lars H. ; Klaus, Bettina |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0364-765X, ZDB-ID 195683-8. - Vol. 39.2014, 4, p. 949-966
|
Subject: | deferred-acceptance mechanism | indivisible objects allocation | multiple tie-breaking | school choice | strategy-proofness | Schulauswahl | School choice | Allokation | Allocation | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods |
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