Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
Year of publication: |
February 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hoang, Lê Nguyên |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 48.2017, 3, p. 659-678
|
Subject: | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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