Strategy-proofness on bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object

Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Yu Nakayama

We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategyproofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	February 2016
Authors:	Hashimoto, Kazuhiko ; Nakayama, Yu
Publisher:	Osaka, Japan : The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Subject:	Strategy-proofness \| Ownership lower bound \| Equal right lower bound \| Impossibility result \| Finitely restricted preference domains \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Insolvenz \| Insolvency \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences

freely available

Full text |

More access options

www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten)
Series:	Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research. - Osaka : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2435-0982, ZDB-ID 2106942-6. - Vol. no. 961
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/148189 [Handle]
Classification:	d47 ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434024