Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Martínez, Ricardo ; Moreno, Bernardo |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 17.2013, 4, p. 323-333
|
Subject: | Preference aggregation | Strategy-proofness | Tops-onlyness | Voting by committees | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency |
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