Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
Ricardo Martínez; Bernardo Moreno
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Martínez, Ricardo ; Moreno, Bernardo |
| Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 17.2013, 4, p. 323-333
|
| Subject: | Preference aggregation | Strategy-proofness | Tops-onlyness | Voting by committees | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223124