Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority

This paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment to punishing violators. Commitment of resources su±cient to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules suitable for a limited authority to assure that compliance prevails in the long run under stochastic evolution.

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Year of publication:	2006-12
Authors:	Steiner, Jakub
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
Subject:	Commitment \| Enforcement \| Punishment \| Stochastic Evolution

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	ESE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	1 pages long
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D64 - Altruism ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750741