Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Savva, Foivos |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 78.2018, p. 27-34
|
Subject: | Partial honesty | Strong implementation | Tie-breaking rule | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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