Subjective evaluations : discretionary bonuses and feedback credibility

William Fuchs

We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good matches are less inclined to accept outside offers.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Fuchs, William
Publisher:	Bonn : IZA
Subject:	discretionary bonuses \| feedback \| signalling \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Mitarbeiterbindung \| Employee retention \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (9 S.)
Series:	Discussion paper series / IZA. - Bonn : IZA, ZDB-ID 2120053-1. - Vol. 7758
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/90004 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; M5 - Personnel Economics
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221557