Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
Xiaogang Che, Yangguang Huang, Le Zhang
| Year of publication: |
2021
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Che, XiaoGang ; Huang, Yangguang ; Zhang, Le |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 130.2021, p. 425-442
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| Subject: | Collusion | Multiple agents | Optimal contract | Supervisory efficiency | Three-level hierarchy | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Hierarchie | Hierarchy | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Effizienz | Efficiency | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Kartell | Cartel | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.003 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012820357