Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Raghavan, Madhav |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 91.2020, p. 1-10
|
Subject: | House allocation | Housing markets | Non-bossiness | Priority rules | Strategy-proofness | Top-trading cycles | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory | Wohnungsmarkt | Housing market | Allokation | Allocation | Immobilienmarkt | Real estate market | Wohnungspolitik | Housing policy |
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