Takeover Bids and the Relative Prices of Shares that Differ in their Voting Rights

The paper models the relative prices of shares that differ only in their voting rights. The voting premium is derived as a function of the probability of takeover. We analyse how the voting premium is determined by the relative efficiency of the rival, the share structure, and by ownership concentration. The optimal share and ownership structures are derived.

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Year of publication:	1992-09
Authors:	Rydqvist, Kristian
Institutions:	European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Subject:	Takeovers \| Voting Rights \| Shares \| Ownership Structure

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Series:	CEPR Financial Markets Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Available in print. The price is 4.00 pounds or 8.00 dollars per paper
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788853