Takeover Defenses and Dilution : A Welfare Analysis

Existing theory suggests that, in an unregulated market for corporate control, the level of takeovers is suboptimal because shareholders do not receive the full benefit from them. However, existing theory neglects that the threat of takeover may divert managerial effort from productive to defensive activities. This paper shows that, when this is considered, takeovers may in fact be excessive

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Year of publication:	[2003]
Authors:	Arnott, Richard J.
Other Persons:	Chakraborty, Atreya (contributor)
Publisher:	[2003]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	In: Journal of Financial and Quantative Analysis, Forthcoming Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012786966