Taking a shower in Youth Hostels: risks and delights of heterogeneity

Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water temperature. Heterogeneity allows some agents to reach much better temperatures, at the cost of higher risk.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Matzke, Christina ; Challet, Damien
Publisher:	Bonn : University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Unvollkommene Information \| Nichtlineare Optimierung \| Lernprozess \| Koordination \| Public Choice \| Theorie \| coordination \| heterogeneity \| adaptive learning \| non-linear system \| feedback

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Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; 1/2008
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	557268222 [GVK] hdl:10419/27162 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:bonedp:12008 [RePEc]
Classification:	C02 - Mathematical Methods ; C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C63 - Computational Techniques ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264912