Tax Enforcement May Decrease Government Revenue

We analyze the relation between tax enforcement, aggregate output and government revenue when imperfectly competitive firms evade a specific output tax. We show that aggregate output decreases with tax enforcement. Government revenue increases with enforcement when the tax is low. When the tax is high, government revenue is either inversely U-shaped or decreasing with enforcement

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Besfamille, Martin
Other Persons:	De Donder, Philippe (contributor) ; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Öffentliche Einnahmen \| Public revenue \| Theorie \| Theory \| Steuereinnahmen \| Tax revenue \| Finanzverwaltung \| Fiscal administration \| Einkommensteuer \| Income tax \| Steuererhebungsverfahren \| Taxation procedure \| Steuervermeidung \| Tax avoidance
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Bulletin, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 22, 2009 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; H26 - Tax Evasion ; H32 - Firm
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155354