Teaching Tools: A Simple Principal-Agent Experiment for the Classroom.

In this note, the authors describe a simple, flexible, and instructive moral hazard experiment. It can be used in a variety of classes, including principles classes, to illustrate the basic incentive conflicts in principal-agent interactions, the importance of information, and the power of reputational enforcement. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Ortmann, Andreas ; Colander, David
Published in:	Economic Inquiry. - Western Economic Association International - WEAI. - Vol. 35.1997, 2, p. 443-50
Publisher:	Western Economic Association International - WEAI

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005578725