Technical note: incomplete information VCG contracts for common agency
Tal Alon, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ron Lavi, Elisheva Shamash
| Year of publication: |
2024
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Alon, Tal ; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal ; Lavi, Ron ; Shamash, Elisheva |
| Published in: |
Operations research. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5463, ZDB-ID 2019440-7. - Vol. 72.2024, 1, p. 288-299
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| Subject: | common agent | contract | equilibrium | individual rationality | limited liability | Market Analytics and Revenue Management | polynomial complexity | principal | VCG | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Revenue-Management | Revenue management | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Rationalität | Rationality | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/opre.2023.2475 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014505121