Technological standards with local externalities and decentralized behaviour

We model a situation in which agents must choose between two technologies that operate under local, positive network externalities. We find that decentralized behaviour can lead to the emergence of a technical standard, but can also result in a variety of other equilibria. Policy to eliminate non-standardized equilibria can be effected, but in some cases it may be very costly.

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Year of publication:	1998-09-02
Authors:	Miller, John H. ; Cowan, Robin
Published in:	Journal of Evolutionary Economics. - Springer. - Vol. 8.1998, 3, p. 285-296
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Local complementarities \| Technology choice \| Standardization

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D2 - Production and Organizations ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005396154