Temporary Alliance Formation: Endogenous Sequencing in Conflict Games.

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and , in case they win, later they fifht it out among themselves.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Esteban, J. ; Sakovics, J.
Institutions:	El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| ECONOMIC MODELS

More details

Series:	El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	18 pages
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631259