TESTING FOR COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LAND TENURE CONTRACTS IN TEXAS

Share contracts under information asymmetry often involve input application and risk sharing inefficiency. These difficulties are nullified under full information which can be approximated in repeated contracts. We give evidence of cooperation in repeated contracts, indicating the existence of full information efficiency and efficient resource use, despite underlying information asymmetry.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Dasgupta, Siddhartha ; Love, H. Alan ; Knight, Thomas O. ; Devadoss, Stephen
Institutions:	Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA
Subject:	Institutional and Behavioral Economics \| Land Economics/Use

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT Number 20917
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005338805